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Transfer Pricing: Strategies, Practices,
and Tax Minimization
Kenneth Klassen, University of Waterloo; Petro Lisowsky, University of Illinois of Urbana-Champaign; 
and Devan Mescall , University of Saskatchewan1
I n cooperation with the Tax Executives Institute (TEI), we conducted an extensive fi eld survey of 219 mul-tinational company tax directors to provide a detailed account from within multinational corporations of diff erences in transfer pricing practices and strategies, and their role in tax minimization. Transfer 
pricing in a tax setting is a topic shared across accounting, economics, and law disciplines. Within this broad 
literature, the complexities of transfer pricing are oft en simplifi ed while transfer prices themselves are seen as 
an important tool for multinational fi rms to reduce global taxes. For example, Hassett and Newmark (2008) 
state that one mechanism for income shift ing is tax-motivated transfer pricing, defi ning this phenomenon as 
“the practice of multinational corporations of arranging intrafi rm sales such that most of the profi t is made in 
a low-tax country” (p. 208). Media accounts reinforce this perception and blame opportunistic transfer pricing 
for the low amount of taxes paid by large companies in countries such as the U.K., including specifi c mentions 
of Google, eBay, and Starbucks (Bergin 2012 and Milne 2012). However, broader views of tax strategy (e.g., 
Scholes and Wolfson 1992) suggest such one-dimensional analyses ignore other uses of the transfer prices, e.g., 
to support decentralization and coordination (Baldenius et al. 2004).
Due to the proprietary nature of transfer prices, documenting evidence of whether and how much transfer 
pricing facilitates tax avoidance is challenging. Researchers are generally left  with data that provide only an 
external, indirect view of fi rms’ operations and internal transactions (Gordon and Hines 2002; Jacob 1996). 
In addition, there are many challenges in identifying international tax planning from fi nancial statements (see 
Donohoe et al. 2012), leaving researchers to use less conventional methods and data sources. For example, 
Blouin et al. (2012) use proprietary data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) to examine transfer 
pricing within fi rms. We complement these studies by using our TEI survey participants to directly evaluate 
the links between transfer pricing and corporate tax minimization.
Th e goal of this study is to provide a detailed analysis of the role of tax departments in the setting of 
transfer prices. We undertake this analysis to inform tax policy setters, practitioners, advisors, and researchers 
studying this growing area of activity. Global tax authorities have raised concern about the loss of tax revenues 
that may be the result of aggressive transfer pricing practices (OECD 2013). In 2010, the U.S. Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) announced a greater focus on transfer pricing to address potential revenue loss including plans 
to increase staffi  ng by creating a new Director of Transfer Pricing position, which was fi lled in 2011 (Ossi and 
Shepherd 2010). Th e global professional services fi rm Ernst & Young (E&Y) began surveying tax authorities in 
1995, and in their most recent survey of 48 tax authorities in 2012, they conclude:
“One constant runs through the history of the survey: tax authorities continue to add staff  
devoted to transfer pricing. In a climate of budget freezes for many government agencies, 
tax authorities appear to have made the cost/benefi t calculation to incur additional staffi  ng 
costs in order to investigate transfer pricing. Th e penalty burden is also increasing.” (Ernst & 
Young 2012, p. 7)
Given the tax enforcement environment, aggressively using transfer prices to reduce taxes may not be op-
timal for all companies. In fact, the same E&Y report also advises that “[t]axpayers should not be complacent 
about their transfer pricing risk” and recommends that “[c]ompanies should pursue tax certainty” (p. 5). Th is 
sentiment is echoed by Alvarez and Marsal Taxand’s 2012 survey of chief fi nancial offi  cers who identify transfer 
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pricing as the largest tax risk facing multinational companies. In the academic literature, Towery (2013) fi nds 
that the second-largest area of corporate income tax uncertainty as disclosed on the IRS’s Schedule UTP in 
2010 is related to international transfer pricing. Also, Mescall and Klassen (2013) fi nd that increased tax risk 
related to strict transfer pricing enforcement adversely impacts cross-border merger and acquisition premia. 
Given the growing focus on minimizing tax risk, it is therefore unclear for which multinational corporations 
transfer pricing is a useful tool for tax minimization, and for which corporations the operational and enforce-
ment costs are too great to risk implementing aggressive transfer pricing strategies.
We provide a rich, detailed, and direct account of transfer pricing for tax purposes, as reported by mul-
tinational corporations’ tax departments. Our survey shows that a larger proportion of multinational fi rms 
assess their transfer pricing practices on compliance-based measures than on tax minimization measures, con-
trary to stereotypes on the (near) ubiquitous exploitation of transfer prices by multinational fi rms to reduce 
their tax burdens.2 We also fi nd that, among transfer pricing strategies, nonmanufacturing fi rms are more 
likely to adopt a goal of tax minimization than manufacturing fi rms. In addition, fi rms with less intense inter-
nationalization are more likely to pursue a goal of tax compliance as opposed to minimization. Th ese results 
are consistent with the transfer pricing literature that uses indirect evidence. We also fi nd that transfer pricing 
consumes, on average, a larger proportion of tax budgets in nonmanufacturing fi rms and fi rms with more 
intense internationalization. Similarly, fi rms that assess their transfer pricing success using a goal of tax mini-
mization spend a higher percentage of their transfer pricing resources on tax planning compared to fi rms that 
assess their transfer pricing success using a goal of tax compliance.
Our data reveal that fi rms assessing transfer pricing success using the goal of tax minimization have more 
experienced personnel, more well-funded internal tax departments, and more resources devoted to tax plan-
ning. Further, the frequency of managers citing a goal of tax minimization increases when the fi rms’ transfer 
pricing objectives focus on reducing cash taxes paid. In multivariate analyses, we estimate that focusing on 
cash taxes as a goal of transfer pricing reduces eff ective tax rates (ETRs) by approximately 3.7 percentage 
points. Yet fi rms that focus on tax compliance to assess the success of their transfer pricing practices report 
ETRs that are 5.4 percentage points higher than fi rms claiming neither goal.
Finally, our respondents report that over the past decade, transfer pricing has become a larger portion 
of fi rms’ overall tax budgets. Over half of our respondents indicated that their transfer pricing functions are 
underfunded, although we fi nd no evidence that compliance burdens have resulted in tax planning being inac-
cessible to smaller fi rms. Overall, our unique survey data allow us to refi ne our understanding of when transfer 
pricing results (and does not result) in tax reduction. We highlight that transfer pricing opportunities do not 
result in uniform tax minimization across all multinationals because fi rm-specifi c strategies and practices dif-
fer substantially across these fi rms.
In sum, our study is a fi rst step towards providing new and direct evidence on the role of transfer pricing 
in tax minimization. Th e results should interest researchers, practitioners, and tax authorities interested in the 
growing area of transfer pricing implementation and compliance. Although our evidence shows that transfer 
pricing is a material tax minimization tool and that a signifi cant number of fi rms are evaluating their transfer 
pricing success based on tax minimization, we also provide strong evidence that even more frequent are mul-
tinationals’ goal to comply with international tax laws.
2 Although it is possible that the respondents are more reluctant to suggest that their goals lean more toward tax minimization rather than tax compliance, our 
multivariate regression tests show that their perception of how they are measured is indeed strongly linked to the actual effective tax rates reported by these fi rms. 
Thus, to the extent the respondents distort how their transfer pricing practices are evaluated, it would only work against us fi nding signifi cant results when testing 
their link to GAAP effective tax rates.
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